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Abstract
In the narrow sense, financial stability is defined as price stability and the sound-
ness of financial institutions. Although this definition can be extended to cover the
functioning of financial markets, asset price volatility, risk management practices of
institutions, etc., financial soundness of banks is still at the center of stability concerns.
In this context, several methods have been developed to measure stability in terms of
a common metric. In this paper, we analyze the stability of the Turkish banking sec-
tor in the period of 2000-2006 by applying an option theory based method that al-
lows the estimation of default probability of the sector. We conclude that stability (de-
fault probability) was the weakest (highest) in 2001 and it entered in a healthy path
after 2003. Furthermore, the sector resisted strongly to the May-June turmoil of 2006.
Soundness of the sector remains relatively stable following the turmoil period. 
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Özet - Türk Bankac›l›k Sektöründe Finansal ‹stikrar
Finansal istikrar, en dar ﬂekliyle fiyat istikrar› ve finansal kuruluﬂlar›n sa¤laml›¤› ola-
rak tan›mlanmaktad›r. Bu tan›m›n, finansal piyasalar›n iﬂlevselli¤ini, varl›k fiyatlar›ndaki
dalgalanmay›, kuruluﬂlar›n risk yönetim becerilerini ve benzeri hususlar› da kapsayacak
ﬂekilde geniﬂletilmesi mümkün olmas›na ra¤men, bankalar›n sa¤laml›¤› hâlâ istikrar
kayg›lar›n›n merkezinde bulunmaktad›r. Bu çerçevede, istikrar› ortak ölçütlerle belirle-
meye çal›ﬂan yöntemler geliﬂtirilmiﬂtir. Bu çal›ﬂmada, temerrüt olas›l›¤›n› tahmin etme-
ye yarayan ve opsiyon fiyatlamas›na dayanan bir yöntemi uygulamak suretiyle
2000–2006 döneminde Türk bankac›l›k sektöründeki istikrar› analiz etmekteyiz. Bulgu-
lar›m›za göre, istikrar›n (temerrüt olas›l›¤›n›n) en zay›f (en yüksek) oldu¤u y›l 2001’dir
ve istikrar 2003’ten sonra sa¤l›kl› bir patikaya girmiﬂtir. Ayr›ca, sektör May›s-Haziran
2006 dalgalanmas›na karﬂ› güçlü bir ﬂekilde dayanm›ﬂt›r. Sektörün sa¤laml›¤›, söz ko-
nusu dalgalanmay› takiben göreli olarak tekrar istikrarl› bir seyir izlemektedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Finansal ‹stikrar, Opsiyon Modeli, Temerrüt Riski, Bankac›l›k
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Financial stability has been one of the most important issues for policy makers
during the last decade both in developed and emerging economies. During this pe-
riod, price stability and the soundness of financial institutions have been used com-
monly as a definition for financial stability. However, recent literature in this area
suggests that financial stability is a more complex phenomenon which can not be
described only with price stability and the soundness of financial institutions. Despi-
te the fact that there is still no unique and widely accepted definition of financial
stability, there are vital ingredients in various financial stability definitions. In this
context, price stability (monetary stability), infrastructure of the financial markets,
functioning of financial markets, soundness of financial institutions – usually unders-
tood as the banking stability-, confidence in financial institutions and relevant regu-
latory authorities, sound economic growth, asset price volatility, sustainable capital
flows, reliable risk management practices of financial institutions, and the interacti-
on between these variables are emphasized mostly together with the concept of fi-
nancial stability. Among them, the stability of the banking sector is perhaps the
most crucial element of financial stability. 
While the definition of financial stability needs to be further explored, there is a
growing interest in measuring financial stability in order to take proactive measures
to avoid any sources of instability. Similar to the multi definition nature of financial
stability, there are various ways of measuring it. The methods of measuring stability
vary from a range of basic approaches to complex modeling techniques. Accounting
and financial ratio analyses are used to examine the financial soundness of financi-
al institutions. Statistical and econometric methods are more advanced approaches
and have the advantage of doing in depth analysis or examination over a time pe-
riod. Complex approaches like credit risk models (reduced form and structural ap-
proaches) are financial theory based and are employed to assess the financial stabi-
lity of an individual institution, a sector or the financial system as a whole. Further-
more, credit risk models are better suited for implementing stress tests or analyzing
the risk transfer mechanisms between different sectors of the economy.
In this paper, we apply Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model (Merton, 1974) which
is within the class of credit risk models as classified above, also referred as KMV-Mer-
ton1 model (Bharath and Shumway, 2004) for the period of 2000-2006 to estima-
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(1) KMV model is commercialized by Moody’s and is referred as Moody’s KMV model.te the probability of default (PD) for the Turkish banking sector. This study is a first
attempt to use this model on the Turkish banking sector that covers the financial
(banking) crisis period of 2000 and 2001. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. 
In section 2, we try to summarize the literature in this field. Section 3 provides a
brief overview of the Turkish banking sector with an emphasis on the financial cri-
ses observed in 2000 and 2001. The main properties of the BSM model applied in
this study are summarized in section 4. In section 5, relevant data sources are exp-
lained and results of the estimation are provided. Section 6 concludes the paper
with remarks on stability and policy issues.
2. Review of Literature on Measurement of Stability
The concept of stability is closely linked with the soundness of financial instituti-
ons and/or sectors. An institution can be considered as relatively stable if it has the
capacity to fulfill its obligations or alternatively if it has a very low default probabi-
lity in any circumstances. Contrary to this, it can be considered as instable if it can
not meet its liabilities with the assets owned by the institution. Analogously, a sec-
tor can be seen instable if in aggregate, the firms in that sector will not be able to
meet their obligations in a foreseen future. In reality, an institution may or may not
default depending on internal factors, such as its financial stance and the external
factors surrounding the institution. In a sense, statistically speaking, the occurrence
of default can be seen as a random variable since there might be factors that are
not controllable by the institution itself. That is why, financial stability measurement
techniques rely on financial statements and/or probabilistic measures like probabi-
lity of default. In this framework, measurement efforts on financial stability issues
can be broadly distinguished in several ways. 
A common distinction is made between micro and macro approaches (Van den
End and Tabbae, 2005). For instance, financial soundness indicators of IMF are com-
posed of a set of economic variables that are used as tools for assessing the
strengths and the vulnerabilities of the financial system which requires the collecti-
on of micro and macro indicators. The IMF’s system is useful in terms of providing
a method that is easily applicable and allows for comparison on international levels.
On the other hand, micro approaches can also be applied to specific institutions or
portfolios to evaluate the stability concerns based on statistical figures.
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and methods that require market data. To begin with, accounting based methods
are the most known tools where financial ratios are used to compare different firms
in the same sector or the performance of the same company in a given period of ti-
me. In certain sectors, financial ratio analyses are so common that it is used in peri-
odical bulletins of relevant institutions or regulatory authorities. Financial ratio analy-
ses have an intuitive insight since there are thresholds or rule of thumbs derived
from historical experiences. For instance, in banking institutions, minimum capital
adequacy ratios or liquidity requirements are set up by regulations in order to miti-
gate the risks of banks. Based on these critical ratios, one may make judgments on
the financial stance of the relevant institution(s) or sector(s). 
Besides, accounting data and financial ratios are sometimes merged with statis-
tical and econometric methods to estimate the probability of default or determi-
nants of default of individual firms or a sector. For example, ordered logit/probit es-
timations (Peresetsky et al, 2004), multivariate discriminant analysis and Z-Score mo-
dels (Altman, 1968) are used widely in this area along with the accounting data ba-
sed models. 
In contrast with the accounting based analyses, structural models (also called
macro-economic credit risk models) are dependent on market data. In these models,
the liability and asset structure and their volatilities are used to predict the default
probabilities of financial or non financial companies. The structural models stem
from Black-Scholes’ (1973) and Merton’s (1974) seminal works on pricing of opti-
ons. This method was further developed by KMV cooperation which was later ac-
quired by Moody’s. These types of models are applied to public companies (Tudela
and Young, 2003, Vassalou and Xing, 2006), to banks (Chan-Lau et al, 2004) or to
various sectors simultaneously (see, for example, Van den End and Tabbea, 2005).
Other examples of such models are applied more comprehensively by taking the risk
transfer mechanisms among the financial, real and public sectors (Gray et al, 2003).
Option theory based contingent claims approach was also used to estimate the so-
vereign default risk of emerging market economies (Gapen et al, 2005). 
Within the class of the macro-economic credit risk models, there are also appro-
aches which are not of the nature of contingent claims analysis. For example, Van
Lelyveld and Liedorp (2004) investigate the contagion risks in Dutch interbank mar-
ket by means of interbank-lending matrix which is solved by a method called en-
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risk model that requires the estimation of a singular econometric model to assess
risk structure of the Finnish corporate sector and to conduct stress testing. 
Unlike the international literature, studies in this field on Turkey are limited and
macroeconomic theory based. These studies try to explain the sources of financial
crises (instabilities) instead of measuring and quantifying it. For instance, Özatay
(2004) summarizes the monetary and exchange rate policy of the central bank of
Turkey in the post crisis period with a view to achieve price stability. On the other
hand, Özatay and Sak (2003), argue that the 2001 crisis was triggered by a fragile
banking system. According to this study, increase in currency and maturity mismatc-
hes coupled with the rise in nonperforming loans caused to a risk accumulation in
the banking system. Interest rate and exchange rate risk were seen as the main so-
urces of accumulated risk. Similarly, Uygur (2001) emphasizes not only the role of
FX position of banks during the financial crisis but also other types of vulnerable
macroeconomic fundamentals. However, none of these studies on Turkey use a fi-
nancial theory based structural model to measure stability. 
3. Overview of the Turkish Banking Sector
Turkish financial system is dominated by banking institutions. Currently, banks’
assets constitute 88 percent of the total assets of the financial system. As of 2007
total assets of the banking sector is around 485 billion USD (Table 1). Major struc-
tural change in Turkish banking sector occurred after the introduction of financial li-
beralization policies in the 1980s. During this decade, ceilings on interest rates we-
re abolished, interbank money market was set up, Capital Marked Board (CMB) and
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) were established to enhance the efficiency and com-
petition in the financial markets. 
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Table 1: Main Indicators of the Turkish banking sector and National Income
(2) In this method, the aggregate exposure of lending and borrowing is divided proportionally over
all banks in the sector and the distribution which maximizes the uncertainty, or entropy, about
the outcome is calculated. Consequently, financial and non financial institutions started to implement initi-
al public offerings on ISE to raise new funds. On the other hand, the government
changed its borrowing policy from relying on external loans towards internal debt
instruments. Thus, domestic borrowing instruments became increasingly important.
While these reforms took place, de novo entry in the banking sector was eased, to-
o. Hence, the number of deposit banks which was 52 in 1988 increased to 62 in
1999. High interest bearing and risk free government debt instruments motivated
the de novo entries into the sector especially during the early 1990s. 
At the same time, 1990s were the starting era of structural problems in the ban-
king sector. In this period, banks began to decrease the amount of traditional ban-
king activities in their portfolios and invested more in risk free government debt ins-
truments. High borrowing requirement of the government accompanied by loose
monetary policies culminated into a high inflationary environment that eventually
led to prohibitively high real interest rates in the economy. Meanwhile, interest ra-
te policies of the government created a “crowding out” effect for the private sector
by demanding the bulk of the savings in the economy. Increasing risks in the finan-
cial system lowered the average maturity of savings and led to excessively high lo-
an interest rates. In these circumstances, some banking groups with industrial and
non industrial subsidiaries financed their own companies with the very short run and
high interest rates. The Turkish economy and the financial system were further wor-
sened by domestic political instabilities as well as by the international borrowing
conditions for emerging markets during the late 1990s (crises in East Asia and Rus-
sia over the years 1997-1999). Moreover, inadequate level of own funds, maturity
mismatch, high amount of non performing loans, high level of “open FX” positions
(being short in FX), insufficient risk management practices, and bad governance
contributed to the structural problems of the Turkish banking sector. 
East Asian crises and the financial (FX) crises of 2000-2001 aggravated the we-
ak financial stance of banks. As a result, a total of 21 banks were transferred to the
Saving Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) between the years of 1997 and 2002 as they
were not able to meet their liabilities. These banks were sold, merged or liquidated
within the framework of the Banking Sector Restructuring Program. The implemen-
tation of this program amounted to a cost of one third of the domestic product as
of 2002 under the full blanket guarantee system for deposits by the government
(BRSA, 2003). Consequently, the number of deposit taking banks declined to 46 in
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transferred to the SDIF, only three of them were open to public on the stock exc-
hange market (ISE). 
After the devastating financial crises of 2000-2001, the rehabilitation procedure
with the aforementioned restructuring program of the banking sector produced
very positive results. The strengthening of state, private banks and the improvement
of the regulatory and supervisory framework contributed to the stability of the ban-
king sector. As a matter of fact, by the end of 2006, the number of deposit banks
decreased further to 33. However, this time the decline in the number of deposit
banks was due to voluntary mergers and acquisitions as a result of the consolidati-
on in the sector and the increasing competition concerns. Besides, both high econo-
mic growth rates following the recent crises and Turkey’s accession towards Euro-
pean Union membership boosted foreign direct capital flows towards the banking
sector which in turn increased considerably the franchise value of banks operating
in Turkey. 
Nonetheless, financial stability concerns continue to be an important feature of
the sector when the behaviors of domestic and international investors are taken in-
to account. For instance, in May-June 2006, similar to the other emerging markets,
the high volatility in international capital markets created doubts about the sustaina-
bility of strength of the Turkish economy. Subsequently, the Turkish currency dep-
reciated around 20% which was known to be overvalued against the hard currenci-
es. As apparent from Figure 1, Turkish currency has been getting stronger in real
terms against the basket of USD and Euro from the year 2002 till the May-June tur-
bulence of 20063. The dashed line in Figure 1 displays the volatile path of portfolio
investments by foreign residents in Turkey4.
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(3) The real exchange rate index (average of 1995=100) of central bank of Turkey is calculated by
taking domestic and foreign price levels and is interpreted as follows; Turkish currency appreci-
ates against USD and Euro when the value of the index rises and depreciates vice versa.
(4) Balance of payment statistics, central bank of Turkey. Positive values mean capital inflow, where-
as negative values correspond to capital outflows.
Table 2: Number of banks in the Turkish banking sectorThe Turkish banking sector resisted strongly to the exchange rate shock despite
its adverse effect on capital adequacy of the sector. During the May-June 2006 tur-
moil period the sector experienced loss in FX transactions which was compensated
by interest income and gains in efficiency (BDDK 2006 and 20075). Moreover,
thanks to the regulatory limits on FX positions, open positions were not a major con-
cern anymore and the sector recovered some portion of the losses and restored par-
tially its capital adequacy ratio. From Table 3, it can be observed that after the tur-
moil in May-June 2006, profitability of the sector continued to increase, despite the
losses in FX transactions, and the decline in capital adequacy of sector which fell
from 23,5% (March 2006) to 18,6% in June 2006, increased again to 22,3% as of
end 2006. It is clear from Table 3 that most of the on-balance sheet open position
was hedged by off-balance sheet items eventually leading to a more sound banking
system despite the presence of FX open position.
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Figure 1: Reel Exchange Rate Index (1995=100)
Table 3: Profitability, FX position and the capital adequacy of the sector
(5) This issue is explained in the profitability parts of these reports.Subsequently, many stakeholders of the financial system interpreted this period
as a test of the banking sector and argued that important benefits were achieved
via the strengthening efforts of the sector. But, as long as domestic currency rema-
ins to be overvalued and foreign capital inflows are volatile, stability concerns in the
banking sector will be on the top of the agenda of the stakeholders.
4. Methodology 
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) have developed an option pricing mo-
del (contingency claims analysis) that can also be used to compute default measures
for banks. According to this model, equity of a bank can be seen as a call option on
the firm’s (hereafter bank) assets. Basically, the liability side of the balance sheet of a
bank is composed of debt and equity. The equity holders have the right but not the
obligation to pay back the debt to the creditors of the bank and take the remaining
of the assets of the bank. In other words, the holders of the equity can demand the
residual assets after all liabilities are paid back to the debt holders. To put it different-
ly, equity is a call option on the bank’s assets with strike price equal to the book valu-
e of the bank’s liabilities (Vassalou and Xing, 2006).
In this model, the market value (VA) of a bank’s underlying assets follows a geo-
metric Brownian motion with an instantaneous drift (µ) and volatility (σ). 
(1)
In equation (1), W is a standard Wiener process. The book value of debt at time t
is denoted by D which will mature at time T. The market value of bank’s equity (VE) is
a call option on VA and according to the model their relationship is defined by the fol-
lowing equation.
(2)
In equation (2), N(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution, r is the risk
free rate and the parameters d1 and d2 are related through the following equations.
(3)
(4)
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via equation (5) that holds instantaneously. 
(5)
Market value of equity can be derived from the market data on equity prices for
banks whose shares are traded on the stock exchange market. Risk free rate r and ma-
turity of debt (T) are also observable parameters. Market value of assets and its volati-
lity have to be derived from the above equations by means of an iterative procedure.
As stated in Crosbie and Bohn (2003), default takes place when the market value
of the bank’s assets is less than the book value of debt (D) at the time of maturity. Al-
ternatively, default happens when the ratio of market value of assets to book value of
debt is less than one. Hence, the probability of default (PD) is the probability that mar-
ket value falls below the book value debt at time T.
(6)
This equation is only an indication of default occurrence and should be interpreted
cautiously. A bank may continue to service its debt due to long term nature of its li-
abilities. Nevertheless, the change of PD value over time can be used as an indication
of the distress in the banking sector. 
Using equation (1), asset value path (with µ and ε being the expected return and
the random component of the assets, respectively) is given as follows;
(7)
where ε is distributed standard normal. Combining equation (6) and (7), probabi-
lity of default is found as
(8)
which can be rearranged as in equation (9).
(9)
From the normality assumption about the term ε of the BSM model, equation (9)
can be converted to 
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where distance-to-default (DD) 
(11)
shows how many standard deviations further from the mean are required for de-
fault to materialize.
Several properties of this approach need to be explained. Firstly, the model assu-
mes that the information value inherent in the market prices and financial state-
ments are not beatable. In other words, market values contain all the relevant infor-
mation about factors that are the main determinants of default risk. Secondly, cur-
rent values of the bank are used to estimate the future values of default risk. Thirdly
and perhaps the most importantly, the model assumes that the random component
(ε) of the assets follows a standard normal distribution. This assumption is conside-
red to be a weakness of the BSM model. In fact, Moody’s KMV model uses an em-
pirical distribution which has fatter tail than the standard normal distribution to
overcome this problem and provides more accurate probability of default values6
(Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). Unfortunately, we do not have the chance to use an em-
pirical distribution on default occurrences for Turkish firms.
For estimation purposes, we follow a procedure similar to the one that is used
by Van den End and Tabbae (2005) in order to obtain the unobserved parameters
of the model. First, observed volatility of equity (σE) is used as an initial estimate for
σA and initial value of VA is chosen arbitrarily. Next, by using equations (2) to (5),
calculated σA and VA values are used as inputs for the next iteration until the diffe-
rence of successive calculations is less than 10-6. Values satisfying this condition gi-
ve us the estimated values of market asset value and asset volatility. As regards the
prediction of drift term (µ) in equation (1), we use the mean log changes in impli-
ed asset values (VA). 
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(6) This issue is not the unique property of Moody’s KMV-Model. It has a more complex estimation
procedure than applied here and in other studies. Furthermore, the model allows for a detailed
specification of the liabilities. However, in our calculations there are two main differences from the similar es-
timation procedures. First, because of the short term structure of liabilities7, we run
the model for a 3 months-horizon (T=1/4) whereas similar studies in this area usu-
ally assume a debt maturity of one year8 (T=1). Second, to eliminate the effects of
large data outliers, the median absolute deviation which produces more robust es-
timations is employed in calculating the implied volatility (σA).
5. Data and the Estimation Results 
Our purpose in this study is to analyze the financial turmoil period and its after-
math using the model as explained in the previous section. For this reason, aggre-
gate data of a number of publicly traded commercial (deposit taking) banks are
used to predict the default probabilities which we interpret as the sector’s stability
indicator. The banks which are in our sample over the estimation period constitute
at least 45 percent of the total assets of the sector. As of December 2006, 67 per-
cent of the assets of the banking sector belongs to the publicly traded banks of
which 70 percent is covered by the banks that we use for estimation purpose. By
the end of 2006, 4 deposit banks are listed at the stock exchange after the financi-
al crisis period so that these banks’ data does not span over our estimation period.
Therefore, remaining banks whose stock value data is available from beginning
1999 are included in our model. Obviously, this restricts the size of the sample. Ne-
vertheless, used data covers those banks whose shares are mostly traded in the Is-
tanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). When transaction volume is taken into account it is ob-
served that by December 2006, 34 percent of the total transaction volume of ISE
consisted of shares of commercial banks9. Listed banks in our sample correspond to
28 percent of the total transaction volume of ISE. In other words, 81% of the tran-
saction volume of banks’ shares is covered in our sample. As a result, the informa-
tion value inherent in the share prices of these banks should not be underestima-
ted. Thus, given our motivation for this study and under these data constraints, we
believe that we have chosen a fairly good sample over the possible longest period. 
Given the disadvantages of the model arising from the standard normal assump-
tion of market values of assets and the lack of an empirical distribution for Turkish
companies in this area, it is likely that probability of default values are overestima-
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(7) The arithmetic average of maturity of deposits is approximately 3 months (BRSA, 2004).
(8) In fact we run the model also for one year. However, 3 months assumption is more realistic for
Turkish banking sector. Moreover, estimations with 1 year horizon produces under or overestimat-
ed DD and PD that is difficult to justify. 
(9) Deposit banks, participation banks and investment and development banks.ted or underestimated10. However, the method is still useful in the sense that if pro-
bability of default is constantly increasing, then we may interpret this event as an
increment of the distress (instability) in the sector. To the contrary, we may conclu-
de that there is an increase in the stability of the banking sector in the periods of
declining probability. Thus, rather than paying much attention to the absolute valu-
e of the probability values, we are interested in its behavior (change) over time. 
Share prices for publicly traded banks are available from the Istanbul Stock Exc-
hange (ISE). Therefore, market value of equity is computable. The risk free interest
rate (r) is the simple average borrowing rate on the Turkish Treasury for domestic
debt instruments with maturity of 3 months (T=1/4). This data is regularly published
by the Treasury of Turkey on a monthly basis. Market value of assets and volatility
of assets are derived from the model as explained in section 4. Data on the book
value of debt are available from the Banks Association of Turkey (BAT)11. Estimati-
on period is 2000-2006 on a monthly basis where past 12 months working day’s da-
ta of market value and volatility of equity have been used to infer the monthly pre-
dictions12.
Before providing the estimated DD and PD values, it will be useful to understand
the change in “market prices” of the banking sector. Figure 2 provides a plot of the
ISE price index of publicly traded Turkish banks (X-bank index13). The index displa-
yed an upward trend till the beginning of 2000 and thereafter became relatively mo-
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(10) Equation (5) will tend to overestimate asset volatility and accordingly PD, if the market leverage
is decreasing quickly. Conversely, if leverage is inclining rapidly then asset volatility and PD will be
underestimated as stated by Crosbie and Bohn (2003).
(11) Book value of debt is derived from quarterly balance sheet data of BAT. Quarterly data is interpo-
lated to obtain monthly figures through the spline function of the R software. 
(12) In other words to estimate the year 2000 data on 1999 is needed.
(13) Available from Reuters database.
Figure 2: ISE Banking Sector Price Indexre volatile with a declining trend. In November 2000 it made a deep when the first
distress of currency crisis was observed. Another low level was attained in February
2001 when the huge currency crisis occurred that forced the government (central
bank) to shift to a free floating exchange rate regime from the pegged one. The ef-
fects of September the 11th (2001) and the general elections in November 2002
are clearly reflected in the X-bank index. Meanwhile, 19 bank failures were obser-
ved between the period of 1997-2001, and 1 in 2002 and 2003, respectively. Ac-
cordingly, the ISE bank price index which was above 24,660 points in 1999 went
down to 13,815 at the end of 2002. The index displayed an upwarding trend after
late 2003 until the May-June turbulence of 2006. Obviously, all the above mentio-
ned developments had an effect on the share prices of publicly traded banks and
therefore on the market values of them.
Figure 3 provides plots of the market value of equity (VE), volatility of equity (σE)
and the book value of debt (D) over the estimation period. Predicted values of mar-
ket value of assets (implied VA), volatility of assets (σA) and the distance-to-default
indicator (DD) of the sector are plotted in Figure 4. For ease of exhibition, the ne-
gative distance-to-default indicator (-DD) is presented14.
22 Münür Yayla, Alper Hekimo¤lu, Mahmut Kutlukaya
Figure 3: Market value of equity, volatility of equity and book value of debt
(14) The increase in the “negative distance to default” means that smaller numbers of standard devi-
ations are required for default to occur.As expected -DD increases with default risk. In our predictions, -DD increases af-
ter the year 2000 and attains its peak level in 2001 during the financial crisis. In the
aftermath of the 2001 crisis, -DD is relatively high but volatile till the beginning of
2003. Later, -DD decreases starting from mid 2003 to the beginning of 2005 and
inclines during the financial turbulence period of May-June 2006. Following this pe-
riod -DD remains flat till the end of 2006.
The mapping of DD value to corresponding probability of default values via the
standard normal distribution captures the financial distress period of 2001 and the
fluctuating period of 2000-2003 (Figure 5). However, due to the tail properties of
standard normal distribution, May-June 2006 turbulence is not reflected in PD indi-
cator contrary to -DD. We think that the normal distribution underestimates the ex-
treme tail events. An empirical distribution with leptokurtic property could capture
the tail events more accurately and provide better estimates of PD.
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Figure 4: Market value of assets, volatility of assets and negative DDNevertheless, as mentioned before we use DD and PD predictions as stability in-
dicators of the sector. Thus, according to the results of the model, Turkish banking
sector was extremely instable in 2001 and signs of instability were dominant till
2003. The sector has entered into a relatively stable path after the beginning of
2003 which seems to continue. Note that the May-June 2006 turbulence in the sec-
tor is captured by DD measure more sensitively than PD indicator. 
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we apply an option theory based model to measure the financial
stability in the Turkish banking sector between the years of 2000 and 2006. In con-
trast to the other studies on Turkey, this study attempts to provide a metric about
financial stability of the Turkish banking sector that covers the financial crisis period
of 2000-2001. The employed model shows that distance to default (DD) and rela-
ted probability of default values of the sector varies over time. According to our fin-
dings, distance to default was smallest in 2001 when actually a number of banks
failed and exited the system. However, according to our estimations the situation
has improved after 2003. Following this year, even in May-June Turmoil of 2006, the
DD values imply that larger numbers of standard deviations are required for default
to occur compared to period 2000-2002.
Thus, we argue that stability of the Turkish banking sector has been increasing
since 2003. Based upon these figures we believe that the sector is in a stronger po-
sition to resist shocks when compared to early 2000s. In fact, May-June financial tur-
moil period has been surpassed without any serious consequences with the help of
regulatory and supervisory improvements in the sector and the overall economy. 
However, overvalued domestic currency, volatile capital inflows, huge current ac-
count deficit, credit boom and other potentially destabilizing factors may affect the
stability of the sector in the future. We believe that the model which was applied in
this study might be used as a surveillance mechanism to assess the strengths and
vulnerabilities of the sector. The approach used in this paper is not the unique way
of measuring stability. Nevertheless, the employment of this approach with comple-
mentary methods will enhance the risk perceptions of the investors and the policy
makers to adopt new strategies or regulations.
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Figure 5: Financial stability estimates (PD) References
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